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course too would have given the litigants an opportunity for full argument
of the crucial issue.
Moreover, there is more at stake in the policy of allowing full argument
than interests of the litigants in a particular dispute. While historically
the judiciary has been restricted to the determination of issues arising out of
litigation between two parties, judicial decisions even within these limits
obviously affect the rights of others similarly situated. They may also in-
fluence important economic and political trends. To the extent that there is
justified fear in allowing a non-elective body to exercise this power, it is
cause for concern when the Supreme Court-even where on the surface a
full-dress argument seems pointless-pronounces final judgment on issues
which representative litigants have not had a chance to contest.
POWER TO STAY FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS PENDING
TERMINATION OF CONCURRENT STATE LITIGATION'*
STATE courts have long exercised discretionary power to stay proceedings
where a suit involving the same parties and issues is already under way in
another forum.1 Stays are customarily ordered on grounds of comity,' or,
(judgment reversed and cause remanded to state supreme court for reconsideration of
the question whether petitioner's conviction had been affirmed on basis of section of
statute different from that section under which he had been tried) ; Musser v. Utah, 333
U.S. 95 (1948) (to afford the state supreme court an opportunity to deal with issue of
federal law by interpreting state statute under which petitioner was convicted, cause
remanded); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (cause remanded to district
court for further hearings to decide whether petitioner pleaded guilty in reliance upon
the erroneous legal advice of a Government agent) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 45 (1924) (reversed with orders not to dis-
charge petitioner until respondent corrected and perfected his findings as required by
statute).
* Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
1. Stays are ordered regardless of the jurisdiction in which the prior suit lies and
without respect to the parties' positions as plaintiff or defendant in the earlier proceeding.
E.g., Oppenheimer v. Carabaya Rubber & Nay. Co., 145 App. Div. 830, 130 N.Y. Supp.
587 (1st Dep't 1911) (favored action in foreign country) ; De La Vergne Mach. Co. v.
New York & B. Brewing Co., 125 App. Div. 649, 110 N.Y. Supp. 24 (2d Dep't 1908)
(parties reversed in second controversy in same state); Allentown Foundry & Machine
Works v. Loretz, 16 App. Div. 72, 44 N.Y. Supp. 689 (2d Dep't 1897) (same plaintiff
in courts of different states); Re Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 274 N.W. 411 (1937) (same
plaintiff in federal and state courts in different states).
"[T]here is no technical rule that the issues and parties must be identical in all re-
spects in order that the trial in one action may be stayed . . . until after the trial of the
other." De La Vergne Mach. Co. v. New York & B. Brewing Co., supra, at 650, 110
N.Y. Supp. at 25 (extra incidental issue requiring additional party in suspended action
might never be reached) ; cf. Vaughan v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 153 Mich. 478, 116 N.W.
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more practically, to avoid unnecessary burdens on courts and defendants. 3
Federal courts likewise grant stays in deference to an earlier action. But, as a
general rule, they do so only where both suits are pending in federal forums."
Where the prior action is in a state court, practical reasons for granting
1086 (1908). Stays of suits involving different individuals in privity with each other
are often granted. E.g., Shanik v. Alter, 268 App. Div. 1007, 1003 (24 Dep't 1944)
(derivative shareholder suits). Peacock v. Lutz & S. Co., 171 App. Div. 256, 157 N.Y.
Supp. 175 (1st Dep't 1916) (assignor and assignee pressing separate actions on same
claim) ; Milvy v. Sperry Corp., 36 N.Y.S2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (actions by voting trust
certificate holders).
Although it is the subsequent action which is ordinarily stayed, circumstances may
occasionally warrant stay of an earlier suit. E.g., Levy v. Pacific Eastern Corp., 154 Misc.
655, 277 N.Y. Supp. 659 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (action with two days priority stayed where
second suit will very likely reach judgment first).
See, generally, Note, 81 L. Ed. 161 (1937). A stay where the same parties and issues
are involved in both suits is closely analogous to a defendant's right to abate the second
of two actions brought by the same party against him for the same cause in the same
state jurisdiction. CLARK, CODE PL.EADING § 95 (2d ed. 1947) ; SnwirAN, Cos. .o:-LAw?
PLEADING § 225 (3d ed., Ballantine, 1923). Abatement, which completely defeats the
later suit, forces the parties to accept adjudication of their claims in the favored suit
because of familiar principles of res judicata. And an order to stay, while merely sus-
pending proceedings, likewise restricts the parties unless the stay is subsequently vacated
and decision is reached before judgment in the earlier action.
2. See, e.g., Levy v. Pacific Eastern Corp., 154 Misc. 655, 657, 277 N.Y. Supp. 659,
662 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; cf. Kianian v. New York Life Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 777, 778 (D.R.I.
1941).
3. See, e.g., Lowenstein v. Diamond Soda Water Mfg. Co., 94 App. Div. 383, 385-6,
88 N.Y. Supp. 313, 315-16 (1st Dep't 1904) ; Allentown Foundry & Machine Works v.
Loretz, 16 App. Div. 72, 73, 44 N.Y. Supp. 6S9, 690 (2d Dep't 1897); Levy v. Pacific
Eastern Corp., 154 Misc. 655, 657-8,277 N.Y. Supp. 659, 663 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
4. Stays of federal actions in deference to duplicate federal proceedings are granted
under the same general circumstances and for the same practical reasons which give
rise to stays of state actions, see notes 1 and 3 supra. E.g., Schwartz v. Kaufman, 46 F.
Supp. 318 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); Ryan v. Seaboard & R. R.R., 89 Fed. 397 (C.C.E.D. Va.
1898) ; Hurd v. loiles, 28 Fed. 897 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1886) ; cf. United States Y. Standard
Oil Co., 7 F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Cal. 1947). The Supreme Court has broadly defined the power
to stay to include the right to suspend proceedings even where plaintiffs in the halted
suit are not represented in the favored suit but, practically, would be largely precluded by
its decision. See Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936); Kansas City
Southern Ry. v. United States, 282 U.S. 760, 763-4 (1931).
A rule of abatement similar to that adopted in the state courts, see note 1 mnpra, is
generally applied by the federal courts where two federal actions are pending which are
identical as to parties, subject matter and relief sought. Sec The Haytian Republic, 154
U.S. 118, 123-4 (1894) ; Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U.S. 588, 592-3 (1878) ;
cf. Johnson v. New York, 0. & V. Ry., 3 F. Supp. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1931) (no abatement
where actions in different districts under special statute) ; Ryan v. Seaboard & R. R.R.,
supra, at 407-8 (query as to propriety, generally, of abatement where different districts).
But this rule is not applied as between federal and state courts. Stanton v. Embrey, 93
U.S. 548 (1877); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Williams, 12 F.2d 773 (1st Cir.
1926). See Gordon v. Gilfoil, 99 U.S. 168, 178 (1878). See, generally, 7 Cyc. FED. Pirc.
§§ 3221-8 (2d ed. 1943).
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stays have'been largely overlooked and the federal action is usually allowed
to proceed. 5
The general refusal of federal courts to order stays in deference to earlier
state proceedings rests on the supposed existence of an indefeasible "right"
to federal trial: ordering a stay amounts to an unauthorized abandonment
of federal jurisdiction to the state courts.' This theory, originating in in-
auspicious dicta,7 has gained respectability through repetition.8
Yet the principle of an "absolute" right has not always been carried into
practice. Thus, in order to avoid multiple suits, district courts have occa-
sionally ignored the federal no-stay rule,9 even though the litigant was
5. E.g., Great North Woods Club v. Raymond, 54 F2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1931); Me-
Clelland v. Carland, 187 Fed. 915 (8th Cir. 1911) ; Woren v. Witherbee, Sherman & Co,,
240 Fed. 1013 (N.D.N.Y. 1917) ; see Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) ;
cf. McClelland v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910); Armour & Co. v. Miller, 91 F.2d 521
'(8th Cir. 1937).
Despite the weight of authority, federal district courts have not always followed
this arbitrary "no stay" rule. See note 9 infra.
6. See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234-5 (1922) ; Great North
Woods Club v. Raymond, supra note 5 at 1018; Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. Quinby, 137
Fed. 882, 893-4 (7th Cir. 1905).
McClelland v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910), has been heavily relied on as supporting
an absolute privilege to proceed to federal trial. While dicta in the case, id. at 281-2,
may be stretched to achieve this effect, it can be done only by ignoring the Court's ex-
plicit refusal to pass upon the validity of a stay when state proceedings are already under
way at the time the federal action is launched. Id. at 282-3.
7. "The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure, because it ap-
proaches the confines of the constitution .... We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one
or the other would be treason to the constitution." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264,
403 (U.S. 1821).
8. See, e.g., Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893) ; Hyde v. Stone,
20 How. 170, 175 (U.S. 1857). And see cases cited note 6 supra.
9. Especially in recent years, stays in deference to state litigation based on practical
considerations of justice have been granted. E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Zimmerer, 66
F, Supp. 492 (D. Neb. 1946); Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
Klanian v. New York Life Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 777 (D.R.I. 1941); Vowinckel v.
N. Clark & Sons, 162 Fed. 991 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1903); see American Brake Shoe &
Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 10 F. Supp. 512, 519 et seq. (S.D,N.Yo
1935), aff'd on opinion below, 76 F2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied sub nor, New
York City v. Murray, 295 U.S. 760 (1935). And the courts of appeal have likewise
evidenced growing dissatisfaction with the rule. In fact, the ninth circuit has already
spoken in language strongly suggestive of a general discretionary power to stay federal
actions pending conclusion of state proceedings. See Butler v. Judge, 116 F2d 1013 (9th
Cir. 1941) ; cf. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Abbott, 130 F.2d 40, 42 (4th Cir. 1942) ;
Southern Pac. Co. v. Klinge, 65 F.2d 85, 86-7 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Hennessy v. Tacoma
Smelting & Refining Co., 129 Fed. 40, 45 (9th Cir. 1904). Even the Supreme Court, by
implication in dictum, appears to have approved a power to stay in deference to state ac-
tions. For in Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-5 (1936), it referred to
cases denying such stays on the "absolute right" theory, see Checker Cab Mfg. Co. v.
Checker Taxi Co., 26 F.2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 1928); Wadleigh v. Veazie, 28 Fed. Cas, 1320,
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thereby denied a federal forum. Similarly, the Supreme Court has endorsed
the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action involving the same questions
already at issue in a state court.'0 And even where multiplicity was not the
foremost consideration, the federal forum has frequently been closed,
sharply contradicting a theory of absolute right. Federal courts, for exam-
ple, have often dismissed or stayed equitable suits in order to avoid inter-
fering with the administration of state laws "1 or passing on the constitu-
tionality of ambiguous state statutes.'2 Admiralty relief has been similarly
withheld in order to assure a jury trial in a state court 11 or to relegate foreign
litigants to a home forum.' 4 And actions involving the internal affairs of an
No. 17,031 (C.C.D. le. 1838), as acceptable only on the ground that "discretion was
abused by a stay of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need."
An important exception to the general "no stay" rule exists in the case of concurrent
actions of an essentially in rein character involving the same res. Because of the special
nature of in ren jurisdiction, federal courts uniformly refuse to proceed to judgment when
the state suit is earlier. Princess Lida of Thurn v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939) ; se
Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1922). See Mcon, JuDmcAL. COv
CommzNTARY 404-5 (1949).
10. Brillhart v. Fxcess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942). "Ordinarily it
would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory
judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, not
governe4 by federal law, between the same parties. Gratuitous interference with the
orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided." Id.
at495. See Note, 51 YAi. LJ. 511 (1942).
11. E.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (complex state regulatory
system for oil production) ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293
(1943) (state fiscal policy); Beal v. Missouri P. RT., 312 U.S. 45 (1941) (state criminal
prosecution) ; Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935) (liquidation of insolvent
state bank under elaborate state administrative system) ; cf. Stainback v. Mo Hock Lok
Po, 336 U.S. 368, 383-4 (1949) (enforcement by injunction of territorial statute);
Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 489-92 (1949) ; Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228,
234-8 (1943). For discussion of such cases and of congressional enactments similarly
restricting the scope of federal judicial interference with state functions, see Mconr,
JunIcss.A CoDE ComnmxnARY 400-2 (1949) ; Comments, 56 YAmz L.J. 1234, 1244-6 (1947),
28 TExAs L. REv. 410 (1950).
12: E.g., Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit
Co., 279 U. S. 159 (1929) ; cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). In Thompson v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940), the Court required submission of an un-
decided question of state law to the state courts even where no constitutional issue was
involved. Cf. In re President and Fellows of Harvard College, 149 F2d 69, 72-3 (1st
Cir. 1945); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 489-92 (1949); Meredith v. Winter
Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-38 (1943).
13. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931) (abuse of discretion where admiralty
court failed to stay limitation of liability proceedings instituted subsequent to action for
damages between same parties in state court).
14. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932) (discre-
tion to dismiss though cause of action arose in domestic waters and the plaintiff would
not recover full damages in home -forum) ; Charter Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Bowring, Jones &
Tidy, Ltd., 281 U.S. 515 (1930) (similar). The statute vesting federal courts with ex-
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out-of-state corporation have been dismissed on the grounds of convenience
and efficient administration of justice.15
In Moltolese v. Kaufman,5 the second circuit recently dealt an additional
blow to the "absolute right" theory. With a state proceeding already under
way, a federal suit had been brought under the guidance of the same attor-
neys against the same defendants on identical claims."7 Relying chiefly on
principles of practical fairness which underlie forum non conveniens,'5 the
court affirmed the power to stay the federal suit. 9
clusive admiralty jurisdiction does not provide for such dismissal of actions between for-
eigners. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1949).
Federal courts have also occasionally exercised a power to dismiss actions at law
brought on a foreign cause of action. Heine v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 F.2d 382
(9th Cir. 1931). See Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 1234, 1242-3 (1947).
15. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) ; see Note, 33 CoL. L. RLV.
492 (1933). As applied in the Guaranty case, the internal affairs rule had the practical
effect of depriving the plaintiff of all federal jurisdiction over most of the defendants.
See the dissent by Justice Stone, 288 U.S. 123, 147. It was replaced by the less arbitrary
forum non conveniens doctrine in Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S.
518, 526-9 (1947). See note 18 infra.
16. 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
17. The attorneys in control of these actions represented a majority of the plaintiffs
in nine original suits which made up the consolidated action. These various state suits
had been started from seven months to a year previous to the filing of the Motolcse suit.
Shortly after the first state action, a federal action similar to the Mottolese suit had been
brought by the attorneys in the name of another plaintiff. 176 F.2d 301-2. This plaintiff
had sought a dismissal of his action. Id. at 302. The Mottolese suit might, therefore, be
explained as an attempt to protect the jurisdiction obtained in the earlier federal action.
But adequate opportunity for such protection would seemingly have been afforded by
intervention in the earlier suit.
18. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. Lumbermens
Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). For discussion of the doctrine and its background,
see Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Cty. L. Ryx. 3P0 (1947)
Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forun, 60 HARv. L. Rxv. 908 (1947) ; Comment, 56
YALE L.J. 1234 (1947).
As originally formulated by the Supreme Court, the doctrine established discretionary
power to dismiss whenever the choice of forum caused undue inconvenience to court and
litigants. Such dismissal could result in depriving the plaintiff of all access to federal
jurisdiction. The difficulties of re-serving process might prevent a second federal action,
And although another forum was in fact available in the Koster and Gulf cases, dismissal
for inconvenience was not in terms conditioned upon accessibility of another federal forum.
Hence dismissal might, in consequence of venue restrictions, result in denying the plaintiff
effective recourse to the federal courts. This could occur where the only convenient
forum lay outside the judicial district of the plaintiff's or defendant's residence.
These problems, however, will not arise under the new Judicial Code: dismissal is re-
placed by transfer to some more convenient district or division in which the action
"might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1949).
19. The court reasoned that the same burdening of defendants which warranted ap-
plication of forum non conveniens equally sustained the stay of burdensome duplicate
litigation. 176 F.2d 301, 303. In further support of the particular stay involved, it relied
on the basic considerations motivating the use of consolidation and equitable intervention
in avoiding multiplicity, see note 23 infra.
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There are sound reasons for the general power to stay adopted in the
Mottolese decision. Any legal impediment has been effectively removed by
progressive undermining of the "absolute right" theory of federal jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, basic considerations which justify the present acceptance
of stays where two federal actions are pending ,'  also apply in the case of
an earlier state proceeding. One tribunal's expenditure of time and effort
will prove wasted since the first decision will be res judicata in the other
suit.2 1 The second action entails an added drain on the defendant's re-
sources which may result in frustration of his legitimate claims or provide
an unscrupulous party with a powerful weapon with which to force his
opponent into an unfair settlement .2 2 Double actions also promote tactical
maneuvering designed to delay the suit proceeding least favorably to the
party's interests.2 3
Judge Fran, in dissenting, 176 F2d 301, 304 et seq., did not clearly disaffirm com-
plete use of the power to stay as a device for avoiding multiple suits in state and federal
forums. He deemed the majority's reliance on forum non conveniens and equitable inter-
vention unwarranted, however, and argued that the court erred in placing the burden of
justifying continuation of the second suit upon the plaintiff. Thus, if Judge Frank were
to acknowledge the power to stay, a conclusion which is not clear from his opinion, he
would apparently feel that the burden should be upon the defendant to offer reasons in
addition to multiplicity for discounting the federal suit.
Judge Frank further opposed the particular stay by pointing to several advantages
of the federal forum: a probable earlier decision, superior pre-trial e.'mmination, see note
32 infra, and greater protection of non-party shareholders by virtue of federal require-
ments of notice of all settlements and dismissals, see note 37 infra. The majority did mod-
ify its stay so as to allow for some advantages of federal jurisdiction. See discussion,
pages 985-6 infra.
20. See note 4 mpra.
21. In allowing the action to proceed, the federal court normally protects only the
contingency that final decision will be reached in that forum. Such a conjectural ad-
vantage certainly does not require absolute protection. Moreover, the fact that each
forum administers the same substantive law, at least where both actions lie in the same
state, see note 27 infra, makes the second suit seem all the more unnecessary.
22. Not only may the defendant be unable to finance the double suits, but his dual
costs may exceed the value of the controverted claim. Burdens may also arise from
mechanical difficulties of simultaneously running tvo parallel actions.
23. The efforts of courts to avoid the evils of multiple litigation are reflected not only
in the granting of stays, but in resort to other judicial measures as well Abatement has
already been mentioned, see notes 1 and 4 supra. See the discussions in Chicago, B. & Q.
1LR. v. Weil, 183 Fed. 956, 960-1 (8th Cir. 1911), and Smith v. Atlantic Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 22 N.H. 21, 23 (1850). Equity frequently assumes jurisdiction to prevent
vexatious and expensive multiple suits. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. O'Neill, 266 U.S.
292 (1924); see, Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 70-1 (1935);
Hale v. Allinson, 188 U.S. 56, 71-80 (1903). See 1 Pomrxmoy, EQurrY JumspraUnmcz
§§243-75 (5th ed., Symons, 1941). And consolidation of related actions in the same
court or jurisdiction is a common means of avoiding needless multiplicity. Dresdner Y.
Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 249-50, 269 N.Y. Supp. 360, 369,
leave to appeal denied, 241 App. Div. 745 (2d Dep't 1934). See Fe, R. Crv. P. 42(a);
3 MooRE & FREmAN, FEmERL PAcrcE § 42.01 (1938) ; CLu&R, CoDE P.rEAD= § 76
(2d ed. 1947).
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In particular cases, however, it might be urged that special advantages of
federal jurisdiction warrant denial of a stay despite these objectionable
features of duplicate litigation. The federal action may provide more ex-
tensive discovery for thorough trial preparation, 24 a speedier adjudication, 5
or a simpler, more efficient procedure less apt to permit technical snarls,
Occasionally there may be additional benefits: a more desirable judge, an
opportunity for jury trial' 2 a different rule of substantive law,N or a forum
24. Deposition and discovery are provided by Federal Rules 26 to 37, Their clear
philosophy of virtually unlimited discovery contrasts sharply with the confused and re-
stricted patterns found in numerous states. Compare KocH, DEPOSITIONS AND DiscovERtY
UNDER THE FEDEAL RULES (Practising Law Institute, Trial Practice Series Monograph
No. 8, 1946), With DAWSON, EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL IN STATE COURTS (Practising
Law Institute, Trial Practice Series Monograph No. 5, 1946). See also EIGHTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW Yonx, 363-6 (1942) ; Pike &
Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38 CoL. L. REv. 1178-98,
1436-43 (1938) ; Comment, Tactical Use and Alnese of Depositions, 59 YALE LJ. 117-121
(1949).
While federal practice respecting the use of evidence obtained through discovery
generally resembles state procedure, occasional deviation from a particular state rule may
afford a substantial benefit to the federal suitor. In the admissibility of depositions, for
instance, advantages may derive from a different federal practice respecting such hiatters
as impeachment of a party's own witnesses, requisite unavailability of witnesses at the trial,
use of the opponent's deposition testimony or of the depositions taken by him, and use of
parts of depositions. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (d, f). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIC § 26,17
(1st ed. 1938) ; Pike & Willis, supra, at 1444-51. Compare Rule 26(d) (3) with the di-
verse state provisions collected in 5 WImoIE, EvmENcE § 1411 n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
25. A federal suit which is tried to the court may reach decision before an earlier
state action tried to a jury since there is typically a greater delay in reaching trial of
jury cases. A similar variance in docket conditions between state and federal courts may
occur even where both suits are tried to the court or to a jury. Thus, in New York
County a tort case presently requires 35 months to reach jury trial, N.Y. Times, March 17,
1950, p. 17, col. 5, whereas in the federal district court for that area jury trial can be
reached in 22 months, Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Frank J. Gunner,
Jr., Calendar Commissioner, United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, dated March 27, 1950, in Yale Law Library.
26. Pleadings in the state court may be so framed that all issues will be tried to
the court, Whereas the same issues raised in the federal action may be triable to a jury.
Thus a party's joinder of legal and equitable claims will "waive" jury trial in New York,
Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993 (1917), but not in the
federal courts. CLAifl, CoDk PLEADING § 17 (2d ed. 1947). And a defendant who inter-
poses a legal counterclaim in an equitable action may "waive" jury trial on his legal claim
in a state court, Behrens v. Kruse, 121 Mim. 28, 142 N.W. 118 (1913), although he does
not do so in the federal court. See CLARK, op. cit. supra, § 17. He may secure a jury,
however, by bringing a new action in the federal forum. See ibid.
27. When both forums lie in a single state, the same law will generally apply in
each. But where the federal forum is in another state, a difference in applicable sub-
stantive law may result. This could occur, for example, where the states apply different
conflicts of law rules or where' two circuits have made conflicting rulings on the samo
question of federal law. , . ., I ,
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nearer to sources of proof. Moreover, in class actions, especially derivative
shareholder suits, the prior state action may have been brought by a plain-
tiff who fails to prosecute diligently because of private settlement 2 or
collusion with the defendant The federal proceeding may then be essen-
tial to the fullest protection of class interests.3
The Mottolese case accepted the need for preserving such legitimate prac-
tical advantages of federal jurisdiction: the court decided that a stay was
proper except if some reason appeared why the claim could not be as speedily
and effectively prosecuted in the state action. Concluding that the only
apparent advantage of the second action was the federal deposition machin-
28. A defendant may be purposely sued in a state forum which is quite burdensome
because distant from necessary witnesses, evidence, etc., located in a different state. Yet
forum non conveniens, which in the federal courts permits transfer to a more convenient
forum, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1949), is not generally applied in state courts where the
convenient forum lies outside the state. See BAm=TT, .supra note 18, at 393. The de-
fendant may e-xtract himself from this predicament only if he can maintain suit in the
nature of a counterclaim in a federal forum which is convenient or from which he can
get a transfer to the preferable district.
Non-resident plaintiffs in diversity actions might seek removal to the federal forum
because of the bias of a state judge or jury. Today, however, this traditional justifica-
tion for diversity jurisdiction is rarely valid. See Friendly, The Historic Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HAsv. L. REv. 483, 510 (1928). The improbability of par-
tiality is reflected in the failure of the new Judicial Code to retain prejudice or local
influence as a basis for removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949). See REvisER's NorTs, 23 U.S.C.
CONG. SERv. 1441 (1948) ; AfooRE, JunicLAL CoD- Cou va ny 224-7 (1949).
29. The plaintiff-stockholder may be purposely suing to achieve a juicy "shakedown"
settlement which will frustrate legitimate corporate claims; or he may initiate suit with
laudable intentions, but yield to an attractive offer of private settlement with a similar
unfortunate result. See Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242,
247-8, 269 N.Y. Supp. 360, 366-7, leave to appeal denied, 241 App. Div. 745 (2d Dep't
1934); Hornstein, Problems of Procedure h; Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 COL L
R-v. 574, 583-4 (1942); Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporatc Abusc-Prescnt
and Future, 41 Co. L. Ray. 405, 425-8 (1941) ; Note, 54 HAnv. L. Rav. 833-7 (1941).
30. The collusive suit is a common technique whereby wrongdoers may defeat a cor-
porate right of action against them: friendly stockholders are persuaded to sue, with
the ultimate result that the suit is discontinued after the statute of limitations has run,
or a consent judgment in favor of defendants is entered, or a court-approved settlement
is reached which, though unfair, cannot be successfully attacked. See Dresdner v. Gold-
man Sachs Trading Corp., supra note 29, at 247-8, 269 N.Y. Supp. at 367; Hornstein,
Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abusc-Present and Future, 41 COL. L I yv. 405, 422,
426 (1941); McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate a Stoct:holdcr's
Suit, 46 YALE L.J. 421,426,428,430 (1936).
31. Intervention by other shareholders in a derivative suit is a matter for judicial
discretion; it may be denied if the judge fails to recognize any actual need for protection.
See BATLAmIr, ConoRATIoxs § 153 (rev. ed. 1946) ; Hornstein, Problcems of Procedure
in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 Coi- L. R-v. 574, 576-7 (1942). Even if interven-
tion is allowed, the original parties' control may still continue. BALY. -F, op. cit. supra,
§ 153; Hornstein, supra, at 577. In either of these events, the federal forum may afford
the outsiders their only chance effectively to prosecute their claims. See Dresdner v.
Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., supra note 29, at 246, 269 N.Y. Supp. at 365-6.
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ery,32 the court approved defendants' motion for a stay only on condition
that plaintiff be allowed to take depositions in the state action which would
be equivalent to those permissible under the federal rules; or, if the defend-
ants refused, that depositions be taken in the federal action and used in
the state proceeding. The federal action would be revived, however, if the
defendants objected to the use of these depositions in the state suit."
Attractive on its face, this modification of the stay order is basically un-
sound. While federal discovery procedures serve a useful purpose, plaintiffs
can use them to create expense, delay, and harassment." And abuse is
especially likely where, as in the Mottolese case, the same attorneys are
directing both class actions.3 5 Furthermore, the conditional stay encourages
double actions brought solely to procure valuable federal discovery while
avoiding undesirable aspects of a complete federal proceeding." A plaintiff
32. 176 F.2d 301, 303. But see note 19 supra. In contrast with the liberal federal
practice, see note 24 supra, New York pre-trial examination is restricted and confused
with respect to scope and persons examinable. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Aar § 288; Sane,
Examinations Before Trial in New York, 36 LAW LiB. J. 112 (1943). Such pre-trial
examination can prove a special handicap in derivative shareholder suits. The complexity
of these suits and the need to procure vital information from hostile witnesses places a
great premium on the availability of complete discovery. Hayes, A Sfudy in Trial Tactics:
Derivative Stockholders' Suits, 43 CoL L. REv. 275, 279-80 (1943); Hornstein, Legal
Controls for Intracorporate Abuse-Present and Future, 41 CoL. L. Rav. 405, 416-22
(1941).
33. 176 F2d 301, 303-4.
Certain defendants in the state suit were not parties to the federal action. As ob-
served by Judge Frank in his dissent, id. at 309, the first alternative would leave plain-
tiffs at a disadvantage in examining these defendants as well as witnesses; as to them
the narrow New York rules for discovery, see note 32 supra, would still apply. In the
spirit of the Mottolese opinion, however, a showing of a need to examine these individuals
should move the district judge to allow their examination in the federal action.
34. "The expense of depositions may be exploited most easily in suits such as deriva-
tive stockholders' actions. Here, of course, the availability of evidence to a plaintiff
from other sources is so limited that depositions are most essential to successful prosecu-
tion. Nonetheless, abuse can arise when the imminence of expensive depositions is used
for shake-down purposes by plaintiffs who have no intention of pursuing their suits
through to trial. The expense of pre-trial examination in such cases can be so large in
comparison to the recovery sought that settlement would be almost mandatory." Com-
ment, Tactical Use-and Abuse of Depositions under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117,
128-9 (1949). See id. at 128 n.52, 129 n.54. Taking of depositions may also be used
needlessly to delay proceedings or to harry the deponent by incessant, irrelevant ques-
tioning with a similar tendency to force an unfair settlement. Id. at 131-2, 136.
35. See note 17 supra. One can infer that the attorneys in the Mottolese case were
only seeking to exploit possible advantages of multiple litigation. Had they merely de-
sired a federal trial, it seems probable that the federal suit could have been brought initially,
particularly since such an action was filed under their guidance less than three weelcs
after the first state suit was begun. Ibid.
36. A stay modified as in the Mottolese case encourages these double actions in at
least four respects. First, any expenses of the federal action other than those incurred in
taking depositions are eliminated. Second, the multiple suitor is assured that no earlier
federal decision will deprive him of the advantages of state trial. Third, the plaintiff is
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seeking an out-of-court shakedown settlement, for example, may avoid the
important federal safeguards which protect his fellow class members-
the requirements of advance notice to class members and court approval
of all compromises.37 Finally, it is an unwarranted extension of concurrent
jurisdiction to allow a party to a state court action to bring a duplicate suit
in the federal courts with the effect that the Federal Rules as to discovery
are made available. Those rules were adopted for use in the federal courts,
not as an adjunct to state actions.2 By substituting federal for state pro-
cedure the federal court effectively supplants the state's legislative will
with its own."1 Whenever a federal court wishes to preserve the advantage
enabled to take depositions when most convenient in terms of the state proceeding, whereas
federal discovery must commonly appear necessary when taken to the prosecution of a
federal action. See note 38 infra. Finally, federal depositions may now be used as
evidence in the state court, see page 986 .rupra.
A plaintiff may have various reasons for seeking to avoid a full federal action. He
may shun the more simple and efficient federal practice because his best chance for success
lies in tripping his opponent procedurally; or he may fear the effect upon the jury of
a federal judge's penetrating commentary on the evidence; or perhaps the state judge is
known to be more partial to the plaintiff's side than is the federal judge. See note 37
infra and accompanying text. Generally, it would seem in the public interest and only
fair to the adversary that a party procuring benefits of federal jurisdiction should be
subjected to its limitations as well.
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c). This is an important protection since abusive settle-
ments and dismissals frequently leave the body of stockholders shorn of all rights. See
notes 29 and 30 supra and 3 Mooaa, FEDERAL PRAcricE 3549-51, 3559-60 (2d ed. 1948).
Yet the rule has no counterpart in some state jurisdictions. See Not% 54 HAnV. L. RE,.
833, 837-8 (1941). In such jurisdictions, the Mottolese-type stay assures complete eva-
sion of this protection while simultaneously making available a procedural instrument
frequently abused in stockholder suits. See note 34 supra.
The New York courts have apparently evolved a notice procedure although there
is no statute or mandatory rule of court requiring it. See Hornstein, New Aspects of
Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 Cor. L. Rav. 1, 20-21 (1947). Since the custom lacks
the compulsion of law, however, there is some merit in Judge Frank's criticism of the
Mottolese stay on the ground that non-party shareholders are afforded less protection
under New York practice than in the federal forum. 176 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1949)
(dissenting opinion).
38. See Bachrach v. General Investment Corp., 31 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)
(deposition disallowed where parallel derivative shareholder action in state court):
"It is a reasonable interpretation of Rule 26(a) that its purpose is to authorize the taking
of a deposition in an action pending in this Court either to make discovery in preparation
for, or to be used as evidence upon the trial of, such action.
".. This [taking of federal depositions in aid of state litigation] does not appear
to me to be within the letter or spirit of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
See also Snap Lite Corp. v. Stewart Warner Corp., 40 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(same holding); see Empire Liquor Corp. v. Gibson Distilling Co., 2 F.R.D. 247, 248
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) ; De Seversky v. Republic Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. 183, 185 (E.D.N.Y.
1941). Contra: Miller-Beck Co. v. MacGowan, 13 F.R.S. 30b.31, Case 2 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (deposition permitted though its only purpose was to aid preparation for state
actions).
39. The federal court is unwilling to permit a similar influencing of its procedure
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of federal discovery machinery, therefore, it should allow the action to pro-
ceed rather than grant a modified stay.
But even where plaintiff's advantages in a federal proceeding may be sub-
stantial, the federal courts should follow the general practice of granting a
stay whenever a state action already in process involves identical parties
and issues.4i The common dangers in concurrent proceedings-wasted
judicial energies, unnecessary burdening of'defendants, and jockeying for
favorable trial positions-create a strong presumption in favor of such prac-
tice.41 Other considerations lend further weight. An individual plaintiff in a
state court should not be permitted to avoid the effects of his choice of
forum by bringing a later federal suit on the same cause.42 Allowing the
second suit affords a method for effectively defeating the federal removal
provision which allows only defendants to remove disputes to the federal
courts.45 Similarly, the state-court defendant whio might have a separate
claim against his opponent in. the first suit should not be allowed to bring an
independent federal action involving the same issues. Having had an equal
chance to launch the first attack, he should be bound, just as the state-court
plaintiff is, by the plaintiff's choice of forum. This is especially true where
the state-court plaintiff cannot practicably engage in twin contests because
by state courts: depositions taken in a pending state proceeding are apparently inadms-
sible in a federal action involving the same parties and issues. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26
(a); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrcE §26.03 (lst ed. 1938). Cf. Atlantic Leasing Co. v.
Gen. Outdoor Adv. Co., 4 FRR.D. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Of course, such state depotitions
may still influence the federal proceeding by uncovering valuable evidence.
40. The federal action may raise issues not posed in the original suit though related
to the same subject matter. But this should not be a means of evading a stay where the
issues could reasonably have been raised by amending the pleadings in the state proceed-
ing. See CLAiK, CODE PLEADING §§ 115, 117 (2d ed. 1947).
The federal action may also contain separate controversies unrelated to the state pro-
ceedings. See the liberal provisions for permissive counterclaims, cross-claims, third
party practice, and joinder of parties and issues, FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (a-h), 14, 18, 19,
20 (a). However, a stay of the controversy which is matched in the state action should
still be possible because the unmatched controversies can be tried separately in tho
federal court. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), 21, 20(b), 13(i), 54(b).
41. Such a course would harmonize with present Supreme Court deference to state
autonomy, see page 981 and note 1 .supra, by avoiding the possibility of rendering state
judicial operations ineffectual. It is significant that in cases requiring parties to seek
relief in the state courts, see notes 11 and 12 supra, availability there of procedlire and
speedy adjudication equivalent to that in the federal forum has not been a condition pre-
cedent to refusal of federal jurisdiction:
42. The probability of abuse is apparent, for advantages of federal jurisdiction can
be anticipated before the first suit is filed. The plaintiff should fare no better than a
party who brings his second action in the same state or federal jurisdiction; such suits are
abated as a matter of course. See notes 1 and 4 4tspra.




of limited funds or the smallness of his claim. 4 A second suit would then
effectively deprive the plaintiff of his original choice of forum.4
Ready granting of stays seems equally applicable to shareholder deriva-
tive suits and similar class actions. Shareholder plaintiffs should be as
bound by the original choice of forum as any private plaintiff.40 The situa-
tion reflected in the Mottolese case where both state and federal actions are
under common control is pregnant with possibilities for abuse of concurrent
jurisdiction.47 But even where the later federal action is not under the same
control as the state suit a stay should usually be ordered unless the subse-
quent action is necessary for adequate representation of shareholder inter-
ests. It is unfair to allow the second plaintiff, who has perhaps plagiarized
the state-court plaintiff's complaint,43 to reach an earlier judgment which
would thereby deprive the first plaintiff of the opportunity to obtain sizeable
counsel fees.49 The award of such fees is a major inducement to the diligent
44. See note 22 snpra.
45. Allowing the defendant to bring the federal suit also circumvents the require-
ments for removal, see note 43 supra. A controversy which would otherwise be tried
only in the state court is, in substance, thereby transferred to the federal forum.
46. The real plaintiff-in-interest, the corporation, is already a party to the state
proceeding. And the right of one among numerous stockholder; to choose a particular
forum may properly be given less weight than the same right of a party suing on his
individual claim. See Koster v. Lumbermens Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-6 (1947).
47. See note 35 stipra. The ability to enter both forums on the same cause of action
should be especially conducive to strike suits aimed at blackjacking defendants into settling
for the nuisance value of the litigation. See BA r. , op. cit. supra note 31, § 149.
Shakedown suits involving legitimate claims, see note 29 stpra, would likewise be en-
couraged by the prospect of a more handsome settlement resulting from the burden of
an additional suit.
Where the same attorneys in parallel derivative actions represent nominally differ-
ent plaintiffs, their common control is likely to have fostered the aual pattern; lawyers
do not always abide scrupulously by the requirement that a client procure initiation of
the action. See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. OF CHL L. Rav. 684, 717-18, n.98 (1941). Presence of common attorneys is not, of
course, a prerequisite for the abuse of double derivative suits-individual stockholders
or their separate legal representatives may also cooperate.
48. - The original complaint, being a readily accessible public record, may be easily
copied. Such plagiarism is highly unfair. Usually the wrongdoing at issue involves com-
plex* transactions which only experts can unravel. Necessary information must be
gleaned from hostile corporate sources. Consequently, a considerable outlay of time and
expense will normally be necessary in procuring enough facts to state a valid cause of
action. See Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse-Present and Future,
41 Cot L. Rv. 405,416-22 (1941).
Plaintiffs frequently guard against suits based on plagiarism of their complaint by
purposely filing-duplicate actions in federal and state courts. See Miller-Beck Co. v. Mac-
Gowan, 13 F.R.S. 30b.31, Case 2, p. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
49. The shareholder who undertakes a suit for the benefit of all stockholders does so
at the risk of considerable personal loss. See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee it Stock-
holder's Derivative Suits, 39 Co. L. Rnv. 784, 791-3 (1939) ; Hornstein, Legal Controls
for Intracorporate Abuse-Present and Future, 41 CoL- L Ray. 405, 427-8 (1941). Yet
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prosecution of derivative actions.w In view of the importance of derivative
suits to the effective policing of corporate management," this incentive
should not be dampened.
The practice of granting stays might also be appropriate to federal pro-
ceedings which include some but not all of the issues and parties present in
the state court. Thus, a stay would seem proper in most cases where the
additional issues,6 2 such as amount of damages, and additional parties,
such as sureties, are incidental to the main controversy.6 3
There may be exceptional circumstances, however, where a federal buit,
though identical with a prior state suit both as to issues and parties, should
nevertheless be allowed to continue. For example, a federal suit should not
be stayed where a derivative or other class action in a state court is not being
prosecuted effectively, and intervention by the new federal plaintiff in a
state proceeding is impossible or would not give adequate protection to the
even if the suit is successful, his proportional interest as shareholder in the recovery will
normally be less than the expenses of litigation. The liberal award of counsel fees and
expenses made from the fund recovered is, therefore, his one means of recouping his
expenditures. See BALLANTiNE, Comuomanoxs § 149 (rev. ed. 1946); Hornstein, New
Aspects of Stockholder" Derivative Suits, 47 CoL. L. Ray. 1, 24-30 (1947) ; Hornstein,
The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COL. L. REV. 784, 791 (1939).
Hence it seems patently unfair to allow another stockholder to eliminate all opportunity
for recovering these fees by reaching an earlier decision in a subsequent federal action.
Often the sole purpose of this second suit will be to grab the award.
50. See BALLANlX., CORPORATIONS § 156 (rev. ed. 1946); Hornstein, The Counsel
Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoL. L. Rav. 784, 791-815 (1939). See note
49 supra. The same is true of class suits generally. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra
note 47, at 715-17.
51. See BALLANTINE, CoaPoRATIoNs § 149 (rev. ed. 1946); McLaughlin, supra note
30, at 423; Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COL. L. REv. 1,
31 (1947).
52. As observed in note 40 supra, additional issues which could have been raised by
amendment in the state proceeding should be treated as though in fact raised there.
53. See De La Vergne Mach. Co. v. New York & B. Brewing Co., 125 App. Div.
649, 650, 110 N.Y. Supp. 24, 25 (2d Dep't 1908). Or, if federal suit by the state-court
defendant would be disposed of by a decision in the state contest favoring his opponent,
then sound discretion might call for a stay. For example, both suits may be brought for
injuries received in an automobile accident, the only substantial issues in each case being
the negligence of the parties. A general verdict for plaintiff in the state court would
establish the federal plaintiff's contributory negligence by collateral estoppel. An opposite
verdict, on the other hand, would leave the question of the federal defendant's negligence
to be determined in the federal action.
The ability to have raised the extra issues by counterclaim in the state court, see
CLAM, CODE PLEADING §§ 101-106 (2d ed. 1947), weighs heavily in favor of a stay: the
federal court should not needlessly sanction departure from its general principle, see
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaim), of completely disposing of all issues
of a dispute in a single action. Other considerations here relevant would include: the
diligence with which the state action was being pressed, the importance of the claims in-
volved, the character of benefits of federal jurisdiction, the burdens imposed on the de-
fendant, plaintiff's delay in bringing the second suit.
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